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FINANCIAL LITERACY OR FINANCIAL CASTIGATION?
john A.E. Pottow*

This year, the Canadians- through their government-convened
Task Force on Financial Literacy - have proudly produced,
"Canadians and their Money: Building a Brighter Financial
Future." 1 Armed with 30 recommendations, its most dramatic
innovation is to recommend the creation of a Financial Literacy
Leader. I have been asked to provide an American perspective on
this report specifically and the broader agenda of "financial
literacy" more generally as a consumer welfare intervention.
Let me start by acknowledging the critiques of the Canadian
Task Force. For example, my Canadian colleague, Saul Schwartz,
has already drafted a compelling analysis of the political economy
behind the report and presented a devastating juxtaposition of the
testimony made available to the task force with the summary and
syntheses in the report itself. 2 It is not flattering. I also recognize
the dizzying array of Canadian government and community
institutions already in existence, including the Financial
Education Institute of Canada, the Financial Consumer Agency
*
I.

2.

University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Matt Monahan for research
assistance and Jacob Ziegel for comments.
Task Force on Financial Literacy, Canadians and their Money: Building a
Brighter Financial Future (Ottawa, 2010) ("Task Force Report"), available at
<http://www .ftnancialliteracyincanada.com >.
I will add to Saul's analysis that the strong voice of the banks in disclaiming
ultimate responsibility is present. See id., at p. 20 ("Governments can help create
the right financial environment through appropriate policies and regulations, but
the burden of making financial decisions ultimately rests with individuals.")
(quotation from TD Bank Financial Group). This evasion of responsibility is in
the face of the Report's conclusion of the need for "shared responsibility." See id.
("We believe that financial literacy is a matter of shared responsibility among
many stakeholders, and have made it a key aspect of the National Strategy.");
see also Jacob Ziegel, "Consumer Insolvencies, Consumer Credit, and
Responsible Lending," in J. Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law
2009 (Toronto, Carswell, 2010), p. 343 (noting need for shared responsibility);
lain Ramsay, "From Truth in Lending to Responsible Lending" (International
Association of Consumer Law, Research Paper, 2008) (documenting developing
socio-legal norm of responsible lending). online: <http://www.iaclaw.org/
Research_papers/Tru thinlendingtoresponsi blelending. pdf> ; Jean Braucher,
"Responsible Lending as an Emerging International Norm," Credit Slips,
online: <http:/fwww.creditslips.org/creditslips/20 II /06/responsible-lending-asan-emerging-international-norm.html >. For an earlier discussion of responsible lending and its need for application in the United States, see John A.E.
Pottow, "Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending," 2007 U. III. L.
Rev. 405.
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of Canada, the Financial Planning Standards Council, the Investor
Education Fund, and the National Advisory Council. 3 That said, I
come to praise the report, not to bury it. For it is only in contrast
to the demoralizing state of affairs in the United States that one
can appreciate just how far ahead the Canadians actually are. 4
Thus, the comparative analysis is that the Canadians' glass is halffull. To be sure, there are still glaring deficiencies on both sides of
the border that warrant further comment. I propose addressing
those deficiencies in part through a call to arms for greater
financial castigation rather than financial literacy education.
The United States. has taken a heavy-handed approach to
financial education in the 2005 BAPCPA legislation. 5 In addition to
mandatory pre-filing "credit counseling" (which in turn contains a
considerable financial education component), there is a mandatory
pre-discharge debtor education course. 6 The apparent belief of the
enacting Congress was that these educational interventions would
reduce the number of bankruptcy filings, the stated aim of the
legislation. 7 So far, the results have been uninspiring. Even the
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

The United States has a Federal Financial Literacy and Education Commission.
See "Financial Literacy and Education Commission" (2011), U.S. Department of
the Treasury, online: <http:jjwww.treasury.govjresource-centerjfinancial-educationjPagesjcommission-index.aspx >. This was presumably deemed insufficient
to prevent the formation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
One striking difference is Schwartz's hostility to the proposed Financial Literacy
Leader in Canada- as being a patsy of no real power- and the groundswell of
opposition to the still-unconfirmed head of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau in the United States - as an unstopple regulatory czar of unparalleled
administrative powers. See Richard Shelby, "44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No
Accountability, No Confirmation" Richard Shelby, United States Senator of
Alabama (May 5, 2011), online: <http://shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
20 II /5/44-u-s-sens-to-obama-no-accountability-no-confirmation >:
The Dodd-Frank Act grants the CFPB director unprecedented authority over
financial institutions and main street businesses. The CFPB director will have
vast rule-making, supervisory, investigative and enforcement powers and
the authority to regulate any person or business that offers or sells a
"financial product or service." This authority will extend to not just
traditional financial institutions, but also potentially thousands of entrepreneurs and small businesses.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of II U.S.C.).
See II U.S.C. § l09(h) (2006) (pre-petition credit counseling requirement); II
U.S.C. § 727(a)(ll) (2006) (pre-discharge debtor education course).
See 151 Cong. Rec. S.l856 (daily ed., March l, 2005) (statement of Sen. C.
Grassley) ("So that I am crystal clear, people who do not have the ability to
repay their debts can still use the bankruptcy system as they would have
before. The bill clearly provides that people of limited income can still file
under chapter 7 and get that fresh start ... so their debts can be wiped away,
as is done right now."); "George W. Bush: Remarks at the Signing of
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U.S. government itself in its first report assessing these BAPCPA
counseling and education requirements unenthusiastically
proclaimed their efficacy "not clear. " 8
Scholars have already questioned the wisdom of mandatory
financial education courses. 9 More broadly, others, under the lead
of Lauren Willis, have launched a greater attack on financial
education as a method of enhancing consumer welfare, arguing
quite forcefully and persuasively that policymakers sublimate
reformist impulses into a mantra of "more financial education" as
a politically expedient alternative to substantive reform (such as,
e.g., reconsideration of usury laws). 10 This reflects at best
Pollyanna-ism and at worst subterfuge. While Willis may be at
times too uncharitable - other studies have found at least some
behaviour modification successfully brought about through
financial literacy programmes 11 - she is surely correct in her
political assessment (not to mention her painstaking
methodological critiques). 12
The inefficacy to date of the financial education efforts
spearheaded by BAPCPA is not surprising. What is more unusual
is the depth of the denial that has taken stranglehold over U.S.
policymakers. There are two principal revelations of this denial I
offer for comparative reflection: first, the "regulatory mindset" to
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act" in John T.
Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project (Santa Barbara,
April 20, 2005), online: The American Presidency Project <http:ffwww.presidency.ucsb.edufwsjindex.php?pid = 63247#axzzl RpMs8Bg6 > ("[T]oo many
people have abused the bankruptcy laws. They've walked away from debts
even when they had the ability to repay them . . . . Under the new law,
Americans who have the ability to pay will be required to pay back at least a
portion of their debts.").
8. See United States Government Accountability Office, GA0-07-203, Report to
Congressional Requesters: Bankruptcy Reform: Value of Credit Counseling
Requirement Is Not Clear (Washington, D.C., Government Accountability
Office, 2007).
9. One prominent skeptic is Lewis Mandell, designer of Jump$tart. See, e.g., Lewis
Mandell, "Financial 'Education in High School" in Overcoming the Saving Slump:
How to Increase the Effectiveness of Financial Education and Saving Programs,
Annamaria Lusardi, ed. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2009).
10. See Lauren E. Willis, "Against Financial-Literacy Education" (2008), 94 Iowa L.
Rev. 197, p. 265.
II. For example, see the studies discussed in Richard Wiener et a!., "Debtor
Education, Financial Literacy, and Pending Bankruptcy Legislation" (2005), 23
Behav. Sci. Law 347, p. 364.
12. For a meticulous unpacking of the methodology of the studies touting the
benefits of financial literacy education, see Lauren E. Willis, "Evidence and
Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Literacy Education" (2009},
46 San Diego L. Rev. 415.
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incentive-crafting legislation inherent in BAPCPA (in contrast to the
Canadian Task Force Report); and second, the blithe ignorance of
failure reflected in the most recent U.S. assessment of BAPCPA's
financial education efforts.
Consider first what I have called the regulatory mindset. Susan
Block-Lieb and Ted Janger published a wonderful analysis of the
homo economus ambitions behind BAPCPA, coupled with compelling
argument that not only are consumers irrational (or perhaps
boundedly rational) participants in the credit markets, but that a
stable equilibrium can be and has been reached with lenders
exploiting those biases, even in highly competitive environments,
as a form of regressive rent-seeking. 13 BAPCPA was designed upon a
full-throated belief that consumer debtor conduct could be crafted
with an assortment of carrots and sticks (mostly sticks): by
harshening the bankruptcy discharge, filings would be reduced
through changes in consumer conduct. 14 Subsequent empirical
research has shown this assumption to be painfully misguided, and
the ensuing collapse of financial markets both heightened attention
to this market's shortcomings and fueled demand for greater
government regulation. 15
Contrast this wooden approach to the Canadians' insistence on
taking heed of cautions flowing from the field of behavioural law
and economics, "[T]he Task Force has taken a close look at
'behavioural economics', a field of study that looks at factors
influencing financial behaviour to understand how people make
decisions about their money." 16 Hyperbolic discounting, to pick
one popular application, is discussed in the task force report
explicitly; not so in BAPCPA. 17 Thus, at least from the American
perspective, it seems that the Canadian approach is being more
realistic in predicting the mechanisms of consumer conduct in
suggesting financial reform.
To be sure, the picture is not so starkly pro-Canadian as I paint.
For example, the recent Dodd-Frank Act's Consumer Financial
13. See Susan Block-Lieb and Edward J. Janger, "The Myth of the Rational
Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided 'Reform' of Bankruptcy Law" (2006), 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1481.
14. See generally Robert M. Lawless et a/., "Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors" (2008), 82 Am. Bankr. L.J. 349.
15. See Block-Lieb and Janger, supra, footnote 13, at p. 1481; see also G. Ray
Warner, "Bankruptcy Reform and Economic Recovery" (2010), 25 J. Civ. Rts. &
Econ. Dev. 181.
16. See Task Force Report, supra, footnote I, at p. 54.
17. See id. ("Choices that do not have immediate relevance (e.g., saving for
retirement) may be delayed to a future time, despite their importance.").
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Protection Bureau is told in its enabling legislation to undertake
considerations of behavioural law and economics. 18 (This is surely
Michael Barr and Elizabeth Warren's influence, and note that Cass
Sunstein is head of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs). 19 And the Canadians, while recognizing the need for
greater simplicity, 20 have not yet come up with an implementing
solution other than exhortation. Consider that since 200 l, the
Bank Act's regulations already required "clear and straightforward
language" in consumer lending documents, policed by the
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada. 21 Yet few would argue
loan documents since then have been clear. As such, it is uncertain
further injunctions to "improve language and presentation" 22 will
have any greater effect. Cynically, one is reminded of the European
Union's new Proposal on Mortgage Lending, which includes draft
disclosure language in simple English for loan documents warning
borrowers, "Your income may change. " 23 Still, the deeper trend is
surely prevalent: the Canadian Task Force's regulatory mindset is
to recognize and embrace the imperfection of the consumer rather
than remain in the thrall of long-discredited beliefs of rational
consumer action.
The second revelation of U.S. denial is in the Justice
Department's 2008 Report to Congress on the "Evaluation of
Instructional Classes in Personal Financial Management for
Consumer Bankruptcy Debtors."24 It's a doozy. (Actually, I
18. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1013(b)(I)(E) (2010) (directing the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau to conduct research on "consumer behavior with respect to
consumer financial products or services"); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 § 301
(2009) (changing certification requirements for financial literacy courses for
young consumer to take account of the course's "proven track record in
producing changed consumer behavior").
19. See Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, "Making Credit Safer" (2008), 157 U.
Pa. L. Rev. I; Michael S. Barr et a/., "The Case for Behaviorally Informed
Regulation" in The Behavioral Foundations of Policy, Eldar Shafir, ed. (New
York, Russell Sage Foundation Press and Princeton University, 2007); Richard
H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health,
Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008).
20. See Task Force Report, supra, footnote I, at p. 56.
21. See id. at p. 72.
22. See id.
23. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Credit Agreements Relating to Residential Property, COM (2011) 142
final (March 31, 2011), p. 51.
24. U.S. Department of Justice, "Report to Congress: Evaluation of Instructional
Classes in Personal Financial Management for Consumer Bankruptcy Debtors"
(Washington, D.C., 2008) ("DOJ Report").
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believe the proper colloquialism might be "boondoggle," at least
for Abt Associates, the consulting service firm to which the project
was outsourced.)25 The report's conclusion proudly trumpets:
Almost all of the consumer bankruptcy debtors (97%) in the pilot study who
took the course utilizing the financial management training curriculum and
materials developed for the EousT [Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee]
expressed a high level of satisfaction with the curriculum. Further, almost
half of the consumer bankruptcy debtors in the ~ilot study reported their
intention to change at least one financial practice. 6

Yet the report then sheepishly tucks in what it suggests is the
only less glowing finding: "The pilot study did not, however, find
substantial improvement in knowledge and financial practices,"
which it explains away as "likely due to pre-existing knowledge
regarding the topics measured. " 27
The U.S. Report sounds like debtor education classes are
mostly, perhaps unambiguously, a success. But that rosy spin
requires further scrutiny. Three metrics of gauging success were
used: self-report of student satisfaction; knowledge improvement
on a "financial skills" questionnaire, and a two-part conduct
review, based first on a statement of intentions regarding future
financial behaviour and second on a follow-up review six months
later. 28 Careful readers should initially question whether all three
criteria should be weighted equally. While I am all for using
triangulation of multiple datapoints in conducting empirical
investigations, surely we should be more interested in whether a
financial education course actually affected the debtor's
subsequent financial life than whether she was happy, as a
matter of psychic utility, that she took the course? (Perhaps I
reveal my own crabbed conception of the goals of financial
education by unfairly shortchanging the "feel-good" payoff.)
Indeed, were we to rank the metrics in ascending order of
relevance, surely most would agree they track the order presented:
Did you like being educated in financial literacy; did you learn
anything; did you learn anything that is going to make you want to
change your life after bankruptcy; and did you learn anything that
is actually going to make you change your life after bankruptcy?
25. The DOJ Report itself is only six pages; the massive Exhibit I is the Abt Associates
report, which is duly padded with plenty of graphics and subject headings,
exhaustively cataloguing debtor experiences with the mandatory financial
education courses.
26. !d. at p. 6.
27. !d.
28. !d. at p. 4.
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Reframed thus, the results from the U.S. study are less
encouraging than the consultants' conclusions portend. True,
while 97% of debtor-students reported being satisfied, 29 only a
smaller percentage (between zero- zero!- and 15% depending
on estimates) improved their scores on the same test administered
before and after the course. 30 (The test itself was an easy toquestion true/false one that resulted in a score of nine or ten out of
ten for 36-47% of respondents- pre-course.) The report authors
interpret the at-best modest improvement in scores after the
financial education course as evidence that many debtors knew all
this stuff already, not that the course added little value.
As for the most important criterion - did anything change as a
result- the report's data do not inspire. Only 44% of respondents
reported an intention to change any one of 10 "financial habits." 31
In other words, more than half had no inclination to change at all.
(Without getting too into the details - I refer the reader to the
U.S. Report itself- it is far from clear that all these "financial
habits" should be coded equally; because of the ordinal ranking,
"compare prices before making purchases" earns the same
treatment as "save money regularly" and "reduce impulse
spending and cut unnecessary spending. ") 32 It gets worse some of the debtors financially regressed, such that they on balance
planned to worsen their financial conduct afterward, and so these
"decelerations" (as the report calls them) would require reducing
the 44% gross estimate above. Now the coup de grace: only at best
half of the "intenders" actually followed through and altered their
conduct within six months, such that, as an upward bound, fewer
than one-quarter of debtors actually had any material change to
conduct as a result of the mandated course. 33 Seventy-five percent
were unaffected in any meaningful way.
The simple explanation for the sunny tone of the report's
conclusions is that Abt wanted to be the harbinger of good news.
Everyone likes success. But surely the deeper reason is the attitude
of denial that has taken hold in the United States - the nearunshakable belief that financial literacy and education is the lowcost panacea to consumer financial distress. 34 With this
29. !d. at p. 5.
30. !d.
31. !d. at p. 26.
32. !d. at p. 5.
33. /d. at pp. 41-42.
34. See Willis, supra, footnote 10, at p. 197.
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preconception, tt ts unsurprising the report's authors found the
glass one-tenth full rather than mostly empty.
If financial literacy education- especially for students forcibly
conscripted through withholding of the bankruptcy discharge - is
not the most efficacious policy intervention, what might be better?
I have a modest proposal to sketch out in only the most barebones
of form, linking together the works of psychologist Richard
Weiner and law professor and advocate Nathalie Martin. 35 It can
be summarized thus: it is time to capitalize on base, raw emotion.
More specifically, I want to make the perhaps unpopular
suggestion that we need to terrorize debtors more. Rather than
financial education, we should have more financial castigation. This
policy argument builds in two parts, and it rests on a seeming
contradiction that l will try to resolve.
The first part of the argument is simply an acknowledgement of
the powerful role of emotion in consumer spending and borrowing
decisions. The works of Richard Wiener and his co-authors
document extensively how some consumers self-medicate ("mood
repair") through consumption patterns. What is even more
illuminating are their findings on not just the inefficacy - but
the sometimes backfiring mood enhancements - of attempts at
financial education and disclosure. For example, Wiener finds that
enhanced disclosure warnings to consumers about to embark on a
simulated shopping spree did have some effect at curbing intended
spending (in contrast to garden-variety disclosures), but for the
subset of consumers who admitted to shopping to end bad moods,
the enhanced disclosures correlated with more credit card
purchasing -- what he calls a "boomerang effect" 36 suggesting perhaps that the disclosure enraged, or perhaps
merely stultified, these mood-dependent shoppers. 37 Moreover,
as for "financial literacy" simpliciter, he finds a low correlation
between financial literacy test scores and intended purchasing
patterns. Thus, one important implication of Wiener's work is that
financial education aimed at rationally educating debtors to
35. See Richard L. Wiener et al., "Psychology and BAPCPA: Enhanced Disclosure and
Emotion" (2006), 71 Mo. L. Rev. 1003; Nathalie Martin and Ocean Tama y
Sweet, "Mind Games: Rethinking BAPCPA's Debtor Education Provisions" (2007),
31 S. Ill. U.L.J. 517.
36. See Wiener, ibid., at p. 1031.
37. See id. at p. 1011. This study is complex, and I am picking only highlights. For
instance, the suggestion above in the text that the mood mediation might be rage
is too quick; Wiener finds an increase in both positive and negative emotions for
"shopaholics" after reading the enhanced disclosures. /d. at p. 1031.
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change their conduct upon seasoned reflection - the theoretical
core of BAPCPA- may be a fool's errand. 38
The second part of the argument takes seriously the work of
Nathalie Martin that details her experiences with and
recommendations for consumer finance classes. 39 She has her
own kindred call to arms for shock and awe in scaring consumers
into fear of credit. In her own colourful words, "Given the
physiological, psychological, and cultural factors influencing the
use of consumer credit, as well as the industry's successful efforts
to indoctrinate American thinking about what is desirable and
affordable, in my view, nothing short of kamikaze tactics will
do." 40 Indeed, Martin's findings are consistent with Willis' (and.
others') 41 that many of the seemingly successful financial
education courses studied to date may actually owe their success
not due to the direct content of the information conveyed but due
to their collateral consequences, such as individual counseling with
an instructor, or pre-commitment techniques, such as cutting up
credit cards. (Willis calls these the "noneducative components" of
financial literacy education.)42 Accordingly, my recommendation
upon synthesizing the multitude of studies best exemplified by
Weiner and Martin is that rather than informing debtors with
mind-numbing curricula on how to calculate interest rates, we
should be scaring the pants off them about how quickly credit
cards can spiral out of control and drive people into bankruptcy. 43
38. This conclusion should not be overstated. In other work, Wiener finds that
financial literacy can be effective. See, e.g., Wiener, supra, footnote II, at p. 347
(finding improved knowledge scores by "trained" debtors taking financial literacy
course, but cautioning that those debtors did not show significant change in
conduct, such as their credit card balances or number paying more than
minimum balance).
39. See Martin, supra, footnote 35, at p. 517.
40. !d. at p. 541.
41. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, "An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in
Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter l3 Completion Not Shown" (2001), 9 Am.
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 557.
42. See Willis, supra, footnote 10, at p. 206. Indeed, it could be that we are talking
past each other in a debate on nomenclature. For example, is the success of just
one community group I have studied recently - the Wisconsin Women's
Business Initiative Corp. - in teaching financial education a result of the direct
curriculum, or the hands-on, community-building ethos that is its "noneducative" aspect? See "Education & Workshops", Wisconsin Women's Business
initiative Corp., online: < https://wwbic.comj?q =education-workshops>.
Building upon this, it is interesting that the Canadian Task Force recommendations include, e.g., such noneducative components as face-to-face pre-counseling
requirements. See Task Force Report, supra, footnote I, at p. 42.
43. See Martin, supra, footnote 35, at p. 540 ("(W]hy teach the wise use of credit,
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"A little fear can be very helpful." 44 (One doubts the industry will
be an enthusiastic sponsor of this sort of intervention.)45
Now the seeming tension: is there a disconnect between, on the
one hand, bemoaning the inefficacy of financial education courses
and, on the other, offering recommendations for a re-design of
their curricula? If Willis is right that this is all a waste of time
(other than, perhaps, math skills), 46 then why bother listening to
Martin? The answer is on the just-discussed distinction between
cognition and emotion. The revised purpose of the financial
education courses would not be for their direct content, but for
their indirect effect of engaging participants' emotions, reconditioning them to develop genuine fear of the consequences
of overindebtedness. Think of all the gory car crash photographs
presented in driver education courses - the visceral reaction is
intended and likely effective. (Indeed, Canadians are well known
for their use of frightening and flaccid cigarette label graphics.)
Why not add stories of "people becoming terminally ill, homeless
or even suicidal as a result of debt"?47 Any tension that might seem
to arise from this loosely formed proposal is thus more apparent
than real. In sum, I agree with Martin, "My theory is that strong
negative emotions are necessary to counteract the industry's highly
effective tactics to encourage harmful spending. " 48

44.

45.

46.
47.
48.

instead of the danger of paying compound interest and the importance of
saving?").
See id., at p. 544. Note that Wiener's findings of "boomerang" reactions could
suggest that the negative affect influence enhanced disclosures had on mood
shoppers could lead to a backfire of my proposal. The easy response to this issue
is to observe my curriculum would be terror-based and possibly invoke wholly
different emotions than those measured on the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS) metric used in his study. The harder response is to try to
disentangle the different roles of positive and negative emotion in mediating and
moderating consumption habits, a question Wiener himself wrestles with in his
analysis.
I was disappointed to learn that this brilliant witticism had effectively been made
already by Martin and Sweet. See id., at p. 540, note 138 ("We suspect that the
consumer credit industry lobbyists that supported BAPCPA would not want
individual consumers to earn interest rather than pay interest.").
Lauren E. Willis, "Financial Education: Lessons Not Learned & Lessons
Learned" (Loyola-LA Legal Studies, Paper No. 2011-22), online: <http://
papers.ssrn.comfsol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id = 1869313## >.
See Martin and Sweet, supra, footnote 35, at p. 544.
See id., at p. 543. A somewhat cognate inquiry involves norm-construction on
thrift. Can emotional manufacturing generate increased thrift? The Canadian
Task Force report touches on thrift. See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra, footnote
1, at p. 57 (discussing the need to reform a "culture that tends to encourage
consumption and immediate gratification"); id., at p. 64 (likening normconstruction to the 1970s' ParticipACTION public service announcement campaign,
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What about progressivity? For example, if the cause of financial
distress is divorced from volitional conduct but is simply the
unhappy consequence of being poor, then what good does it do to
hector these unfortunates with fire-breathing sermons on the evils
of credit? Martin worries about this herself, 49 explicitly
distinguishing recommendations she has for middle class debtors
from those for debtors in poverty. 5 Consider too that the Abt
report finds 83% of debtors attributed an unexpected/unavoidable
change in financial circumstance as a cause of bankruptcy, with a
majority of that majority- 64%- citing the exogenous change
as being the sole cause, i.e., occurring in the absence of any
problems with financial management. 51 This may explain the noncorrelation between cause of bankruptcy and financial literacy test
score. 52 Indeed, the Canadian Task Force report finds that many
people's financial literacy "problems" involve nothing other than
being poor. For example, one of the categories in its National
Financial Literacy Index is "making ends meet," for which it finds
as a demographic matter, I submit unsurprisingly, that "lowincome and low-net-worth households" are scoring poorly. 53
While it seems senselessly cruel to beat up on the already
downtrodden, I nonetheless want to double-down on my proposal
(parting ways with my kindred spirit Martin) and insist that even
the poor, too, should be subjected to some genuine terror on the
risks of consumer credit. This impulse is driven by a couple factors.

°

49.
50.
51.
52.

53.

with catchy slogans such as "0-10-300"). The United States even has a think tank
dedicated to studying thrift. See John Templeton Center for Thrift and
Generosity, online: NewThrift.org <http://newthrift.org/aboutf>; A. Mechele
Dickerson, "Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma Be Taught? Why Credit-Focused
Debtor Education May Not Work" (1999), 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 945. These
important considerations - including macro-economic ramifications - are
beyond the scope of this discussion.
See Martin, supra, footnote 35, at p. 544 ("Such [scare] tactics would likely be too
harsh for bankruptcy debtors, who already have seen financial tragedy, but are
useful for people who have not yet encountered bankruptcy.").
See id., at p. 541.
See DOJ Report, supra, footnote 24, at p. 49.
See id. Only 10% of respondents listed poor financial management/decisionmaking on its own (not in combination with an exogenous shock) as the reason
for bankruptcy. The report authors cautiously say this number might be too low
because of self-serving responses, but their data seem in general accordance with
other studies. See Lawless et a/., supra, footnote 14, at p. 387 (addressing in
methodological appendix self-serving response bias concerns and concluding they
are likely minimal in a context of court filings that are made under oath).
Task Force Report, supra, footnote I, at p. 14. The U.S. report ranks "pay bills
on time each month" as a financial skill. See DOJ Report, supra, footnote 24, at p.
41. It is unclear whether consumers who do not do so have failed in their financial
educations or simply face unwanted liquidity constraints.
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First, even low-income consumers need to be made aware of the
risks of consumer credit products. My desire is not to drive people
from credit cards into the open arms of loan sharks, but to make
them recognize the similarities between credit cards and loan
sharks- debiasing them from the imprimatur of helpfulness and
solicitude that attach to the former's direct mailing brochures. 54
Second, as a rough justice cut at getting the word out and maybe
even changing social consumption norms, I would rather sacrifice
the heightened precision of "message discrimination" than engage
in the costly sorting of who needs to hear the message from who
does not. Is making a non-smoker look at revolting images of
nicotine-laden lungs all that costly? Probably not. (This is
speculation at best, of course, but that probably places me no
worse off than the median legislator.) As such, while I take the
concerns of progressivity seriously, I nevertheless counsel broadsweeping attempts at incentive-shaping through stark, scary
lessons on the perils of credit.
This brief commentary has discussed the U.S. enthusiasm
toward financial education courses, outlining its fundamental
embrace by BAPCPA and persistence in the face of even governmentsponsored research showing dubious results at best. It contrasted
the Canadian Task Force Report, which, for all its shortcomings,
at least recognizes the need for taking heed of behavioural law and
economics and human imperfection more generally. In considering
these experiences, it also offered the modest proposal that, rather
than further reforming financial literacy classes, more energy
should be devoted to an emotional assault on consumer credit:
terrifying consumers that credit cards are not their friends but their
profit-seeking enemies. Of course, it has no hope of passage into
official policy in the face of a well-heeled credit lobby, but the idea
can get out there, working its way through a populist network of
ground-up consumer outreach workshops. 55 Whether this is
branded curricular reform or starting something entirely new is a
54. For the record, I would like to note my objection to the assumption of
substitution effects. Many assume them, and some studies - not without
controversy - have claimed to find them. Suffice it to say for this footnote on a
topic beyond the scope of this article that much more work needs to be done
before I am convinced. For a generic laying out of the argument, see, e.g., Todd J.
Zywicki, "An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis" (2005), 99
N.W.U.L.R. 1463.
55. Consider that one of the recommendations of the Task Force's report is to give
more funding to non-profit organizations to help debtor education on the
community level. See Task Force Report, supra, footnote I, at pp. 22-23.
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tangential matter of semantics. The important point is that it is
time to replace antiseptic education with castigation and terror.

